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We present a prototype of the AICronus system, an 
argumentation system that automates a challenging 
reasoning process used by experts in cosmogenic isotope 
dating. The architecture of the system is described and 
preliminary results are discussed. 
1. Introduction   
Scientific reasoning is a complex process, alternately 
requiring flashes of insight and tedious analysis. This 
dichotomy is evident in constructing a geologic timeline 
for a landform using cosmogenic isotope dating. Experts in 
this field frequently spend months on repetitive math-
ematical tasks, until they have gathered enough 
information to suddenly understand the data. The 
AICronus project is aimed at understanding and automat-
ing this process. 
Automating this reasoning process is challenging because 
the science of cosmogenic isotope dating is quite new. 
There is only a relatively small number of completed, 
detailed analyses to draw knowledge from. Therefore, it is 
necessary to build a knowledge base through interaction 
with experts. Unfortunately, as is often the case, it is 
difficult for these experts to clearly articulate how and why 
they come to specific conclusions. We have been working 
with experts in this field for more than two years, but our 
knowledge base is still very incomplete. Complicating the 
difficulty of acquiring the knowledge used by experts, few 
theories in the area are completely formed or fully 
understood. As a result, most expert analysis relies on 
vague heuristics that are frequently contradictory. Any 
system that automates the timeline construction process, 
then, must be able to handle both contradiction and 
uncertain heuristics gracefully. 
AICronus addresses these issues through the use of a 
nonmonotonic logic called argumentation. Argumentation 
uses symbolic logic, so that rules acquired from experts 
can be directly input into the system. In addition, the 
system’s reasoning can be presented to the user in a legible 
format, facilitating engagement and speeding further 
                                                 
 
knowledge engineering. In the argumentation architecture 
used by AICronus, conclusions can receive partial support 
(modeling uncertain heuristics), and support for a 
conclusion can be defeated by contrasting evidence or rules 
(handling contradiction gracefully).  
This paper presents the prototype version of the 
AICronus system along with some preliminary results, 
which show significant initial success in accurately 
modeling the reasoning process of isotope dating experts.  
Section 2 details the process of constructing a timeline for 
a landform using cosmogenic isotope dating. Section 3 
discusses the particular challenges that arise in attempting 
to automate parts of this process. Section 4 demonstrates 
how argumentation addresses these challenges. Section 5 
discusses the AICronus architecture in more detail. Section 
6 walks through a concrete example of the working system. 
Section 7 discusses future work for the AICronus system, 
and section 8 covers related work. 
2. Cosmogenic Isotope Dating 
Cosmogenic isotope dating is a method for computing 
the age of a landform using radioactive isotope 
measurements of samples taken from that landform. Other 
methods for landform dating rely heavily on heuristic 
examination of features such as lichen growth (Bradwell 
2001). Cosmogenic isotope dating is more consistent and 
less subject to influence from the preconceptions of indi-
vidual geologists. 
This dating procedure is based on the knowledge that 
cosmic rays hit the earth at a fairly constant rate. When 
these rays come into contact with certain stable isotopes, 
they can change stable isotopes into radioactive isotopes 
(e.g. Chlorine-36 or Aluminum-26). Much like radioactive 
decay, the creation of these isotopes happens at a 
calculable rate. Most types of cosmic rays penetrate only a 
few inches, so these radioactive isotopes are generated 
almost exclusively at the surface. This knowledge enables 
a geologist to determine how long a particular sample has 
been at the surface based on the number of radioactive 
isotopes present, the sample’s chemistry, and other factors. 
The mathematics involved are quite complicated, and are 
handled by a different system being developed by the 
iCronus project at CU Boulder under the direction of Dr. 
Bradley and Dr. Anderson (Anderson and Bradley 2006). 
For many landforms, the length of time a sample has 
been at the surface is actually a measure of the age of the 
landform (e.g. moraines, which are formed by glaciers 
carving boulders from deep underground and eventually 
depositing them, along with soil, as the glacier retreats). 
Some landforms are formed over a longer period of time, 
or from rock that was at the surface prior to the landform’s 
formation. In these cases the length of time that samples 
have been at the surface can provide other information 
(e.g. how long the landform took to form) but will not give 
the actual age of the landform. Currently, cosmogenic 
isotope dating is used primarily to estimate ages of 
suddenly-created landforms. 
The process of cosmogenic isotope dating begins with an 
expert taking samples of surface rock (generally thin chips 
from several boulders) from a single landform. Significant 
expertise is needed to choose good samples: sample 
boulders should not be excessively weathered, should show 
no signs of having been rolled or turned, should usually be 
of similar composition to the surrounding surface, etc. In 
many cases it will only be possible to take a small number 
of samples that meet these requirements. Experts also 
record as much data as possible about the location and 
status of the samples, including the sizes of the boulders 
they are collected from, the amount of visible sky, and the 
sample’s exact location. 
After collection, the expert sends the samples to an 
accelerator mass spectrometry (AMS) lab that measures 
the chemical properties of the samples. This includes the 
chemical composition and the percentage of certain 
isotopes (e.g. Chlorine-36 compared to overall Chlorine). 
The lab’s services are extremely costly, further limiting the 
number of samples for which data are available. Based on 
these measurements, information about where the sample 
was taken, and a large amount of background knowledge, 
the expert calculates preliminary (or “apparent”) ages for 
the samples. The background knowledge involved includes 
data about changes in cosmic ray intensity, changes in sea 
level (which affects cosmic ray intensity at particular alti-
tudes), and information about the production rates of the 
isotope in question from other isotopes (Lal 1958). For 
many of these background data, multiple measurements are 
available and will yield slightly different results. Handling 
these calculations and background data is the task of the 
iCronus project (Anderson and Bradley 2006). 
Next, the expert compares the preliminary individual 
ages. If all the apparent sample ages for a single landform 
are the same, within the margins of error introduced by the 
AMS analysis, that age is assigned to the landform and the 
process is complete. However, this happy situation rarely 
occurs. It is more usual for preliminary age measurements 
for different samples to differ by as much as 10,000 years 
(Shanahan and Zreda 2000). In this case, the expert 
attempts to explain the divergence so that s/he can assign a 
single age to the landform. The AICronus system is 
designed to assist with this explanation. 
Sometimes there is no good explanation, or there are sev-
eral explanations that cover the data equally well. Often the 
result of this first round of analysis is the conclusion that 
more samples are needed. This leads to a trip back to the 
original site to collect more samples with the specific 
questions left by the first analysis in mind. Experts can 
focus on samples more likely to determine which candidate 
process is responsible for the skew in the data. Figure 1 
illustrates this cyclic process. 
3. Automation Challenges 
Most explanations for spread in apparent ages come from 
a short list of about fifteen geologic processes that affect 
the preliminary exposure times of samples from a single 
landform. For example, erosion gradually exposes new 
surfaces, causing some samples to have apparent ages 
much younger than the age of the landform. A process 
called inheritance affects samples that were exposed before 
the landform in question was formed, giving them apparent 
ages older than the age of the landform. Other processes 
include cover like snow or vegetation, gradual formation 
such as from soil deposits, or earthquakes, which may 
suddenly expose large amounts of rock at the surface. 
Multiple processes may act on a single landform. Finally, 
possibilities like lab error and mis-sampling must be taken 
into account when explaining the data.  
Although we need only consider explanations from 
among a small number of processes, the complexities of 
how the processes affect the data—especially when multi-
ple processes are involved—make this task far from sim-
ple. Data are noisy and frequently cannot be trusted 
(experts may have mis-identified the type of landform they 
are considering, for example), and the manifestation of one 
process may be quite similar to the manifestations of other 
processes. 
Figure 1: The process of assigning a landform's age.
Most of the processes that affect apparent ages of sam-
ples give the apparent age distribution a characteristic 
shape. For example, matrix erosion of a moraine, which 
gradually exposes new boulders as the top soil of the 
moraine erodes, looks something like a skewed bell curve 
with the peak towards the older end of the scale. On the 
other hand, inheritance usually involves a simple uniform 
distribution over an age range (the distribution is actually a 
Gaussian that is so spread out it appears uniform). Figure 2 
shows some examples of these distributions. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to diagnose the process that 
affected a particular landform from the distribution of 
apparent ages because we rarely have enough samples to 
see the distribution shape. Instead, experts usually perform 
this diagnosis using heuristics about how various types of 
landforms form and how each process affects different 
landforms. Other heuristics are applied to the apparent 
distribution of the small number of samples: experts label 
three samples approximately evenly spaced erosion—not 
inheritance, as we would expect based on the a priori 
knowledge of sample distributions. The experts we are 
working with have not yet been able to explain this 
apparent contradiction. 
Choosing which geologic process is responsible for the 
data is complicated by the fact that there is generally some 
evidence both for and against several processes, a major 
challenge for automatic analysis. From our observation of 
experts in this field, it appears that a standard approach to 
this problem is to select one process and look for evidence 
both for and against that process. If it is possible to gather 
enough evidence in favor of a process and not possible to 
gather a similar or greater amount of evidence against the 
process, then it is considered a good candidate for 
explaining the data.  
4. Solution: Argumentation 
The specific task of AICronus is to assist with the analy-
sis of apparent sample ages and help determine what pro-
cesses are good candidates to explain the spread in 
apparent ages. As just mentioned, many of the heuristics 
that experts use in this process are vague and sometimes 
contradictory. For example, matrix erosion is expected to 
produce a skewed bell curve of initial sample ages. In 
practice, however, experts assign matrix erosion to cases 
that have a uniform distribution (Shanahan and Zreda 
2000). To further complicate matters, inheritance is the 
process expected to produce a uniform distribution! 
Contradictions may also arise when input observations are 
incorrect in some way, for example when samples are 
entered as members of one landform but have actually 
come from two different landforms (Desilets and Zreda 
2006). Heuristics like “this is a moraine, so inheritance is 
more likely” are also common and are clearly not absolute; 
we do not always conclude inheritance when the landform 
is a moraine. Therefore AICronus must gracefully handle 
both contradiction and partial support. 
In addition to these technical issues, experts are unlikely 
to agree with any conclusions made by AICronus unless 
they understand the reasoning behind those conclusions. 
Thus it is also critical to the usefulness of AICronus that it 
be capable of convincingly presenting the reasons for its 
conclusions. This capability provides the additional benefit 
that students of geology can examine the reasoning and 
heuristics that are used in selecting a process. 
Argumentation systems are a good solution here. They 
provide the functionality needed for AICronus to be useful  
to both experts and students in cosmogenic isotope dating. 
They are capable of handling contradictory rules and input 
data, partial support for conclusions, and can report their 
reasoning in a clear and understandable way (Krause, 
Ambler, Elvang-Gøransson, and Fox 1995) (Doyle 1983). 
In fact, the reasoning used in argumentation appears to 
closely match the flexibility and methodology that experts 
in the field actually use in their analyses. 
The argumentation framework used by AICronus is 
based on the Logic of Argumentation introduced by Krause 
et. al. (Krause, Ambler, Elvang-Gøransson, and Fox 1995). 
Unlike in traditional first-order logic systems, rules, input 
data, and “proofs” in argumentation systems may all be 
considered defeasible. Proofs in classical logic correspond 
to arguments in these systems—an argument is a reason for 
believing some conclusion, but contradictory arguments 
may also be formed. 
Krause et. al. implement an argumentation system as a 
labeled logic, where rules and data are labeled with a 
confidence level used to determine which of two 
arguments is stronger. As arguments are built, the 
confidences propagate to their conclusions using some 
system of combination. The confidence values in AICronus 
are in the range [-1, 1], and are currently combined using 
several different functions, selected by which rule is being 
used. Negative confidence in some literal is interpreted as 
confidence in the negation of that literal (zero confidence 
implies the system knows nothing about a term). 
Conclusions generated by the system are labeled with the 
arguments for and against them, so that as new information 
Figure 2: Apparent-age distributions (number of samples 
vs. apparent age) produced by various processes. 
is discovered the arguments about a conclusion can be 
examined and possibly defeated. An argument can be 
defeated in two ways: a stronger argument can be found 
against the conclusion of the argument (rebuttal), or 
arguments can be found against the evidence used in the 
defeated argument (undercutting). 
AICronus treats the arguments for and against a particu-
lar conclusion like grains of sand on a scale. Stronger 
arguments, formed using rules and data with higher con-
fidence levels, add more weight to their side of the balance. 
However, a large enough number of poor arguments on can 
overpower a single good argument. Unlike a balance 
loaded with sand, additional “weight” is added in a system 
of decreasing returns: two poor arguments of the same 
quality will give combined support less than one argument 
of twice their quality. That is, if a single argument has a 
confidence of 0.8, it will defeat two combined, rebutting 
arguments, each with a confidence of 0.4 (but it will be 
defeated by three such arguments). Undercutting is handled 
by reducing the degree of confidence in the undercut 
argument. 
5. Constructing Arguments 
AICronus takes as input all available data about a set of 
samples, along with information about the site where they 
were collected. This includes both qualitative data (e.g. the 
type of landform and the color of the boulder the sample 
was taken from) and quantitative data (e.g. the calculated 
apparent sample ages and the elevation of the landform). 
Information about nearby landforms may also be included 
in the input, since the ages of these landforms may imply 
strict upper or lower bounds on the age of the landform in 
question (e.g. moraines must decrease in age as the eleva-
tion in a single valley increases because of the way they 
are formed). 
AICronus generates a list of processes that may have 
affected the landform, with more-common processes (as 
specified by experts) higher on the list. Arguments for and 
against each process on the list are generated via backward 
chaining, building an argument tree. Once a process has 
been found for which the “pro” evidence significantly 
outweighs the “con” evidence, the system stops and reports 
its results to the user. These results include all of the 
processes so far considered and the complete arguments for 
and against each process. Processes with the most 
convincing arguments are listed first. The user can choose 
to generate arguments for more processes if s/he finds the 
presented results insufficiently convincing. 
5.1. Arguments 
Rules in AICronus have a standard first-order logic struc-
ture, where a rule is written in the form A=>C (A may be a 
single literal or the conjunction of several literals). An 
argument is a collection of trees, with rules from the 
system’s database forming the nodes of the trees. Rules in 
child nodes have the same variable in their conclusions as 
one of the literals on the antecedent side of the parent 
node’s implication. At the root of each tree is a single rule 
that allows us to argue about whether some particular 
process is responsible for the observed data. The leaves of 
the trees are drawn from the observations entered by the 
user. Figure 3 shows an example collection of argument 
trees in AICronus which might read: “Erosion is a likely 
explanation because moraines are likely to erode and this 
landform is a moraine. However, there is no visual 
evidence of erosion such as a flat crest or weathering, 
making erosion a less convincing conclusion.” The total 
confidence in the argument is determined by the total 
confidence in the trees that argue for the root process 
versus the total confidence in the trees that argue against 
the root process. 
5.2. Rules 
In a classical first-order logic system, when the anteced-
ents of an implication are true, we can conclude the 
implicant with absolute confidence. In AICronus, when 
there are arguments supporting the antecedents of the 
implication, they can be used, along with the rule, to form 
an argument for the implicant of the rule. Unlike in a 
classical system, this argument may eventually be 
overturned, possibly causing us to conclude the negation of 
the implicant. 
When combining antecedents with a rule to form an 
argument, the backwards-chaining engine makes no 
distinction between evidence for the antecedent and 
evidence against it. Antecedents with a negative 
confidence rating are treated identically to those with a 
positive confidence, although frequently this case will 
generate an argument against the rule’s implicant. In 
addition to the implication that is the main part of the rule, 
AICronus rules contain guards and instructions for how to 
combine the confidences in the antecedents into confidence 
in the implicant.  
The guards on an AICronus rule prevent the system from 
building arguments using rules that are not applicable to 
the current case. For example, AICronus has a rule that 
snow cover is more likely if samples appear younger at 
higher elevations. However, elevations are recorded for all 
samples, even when they were collected at essentially the 
Figure 3: An example AICronus argument. At the top is the 
conclusion being argued about. Beneath is a collection of trees 
arguing about this conclusion.  Rules are shown in boxes and 
entered observations in ovals. 
same elevation. Obviously the rule only makes sense when 
we are dealing with elevation ranges large enough to have 
different levels of snow cover. Therefore the guard on the 
rule states that it is only applicable when the elevations of 
the samples have a large enough range. 
We intend to produce a standardized methodology to 
combine argument confidences into consistently 
meaningful values. Unfortunately, we currently have an 
insufficient number of cases to generalize confidence. To 
allow for rapid feedback and prototyping, confidence 
combinations are handled somewhat individually until we 
can determine the correct unified method. Our current 
methods for confidence combination include: 
• Scalar combinations: this method uses a linear 
combination to combine the confidences in the 
antecedents into a confidence in the rule’s implicant. 
These combinations are used in rules where all the 
antecedents are directly related to the conclusion. For 
example, moraines are formed with a pointed crest 
which flattens as they erode: A flattened moraine crest is 
evidence for matrix erosion, and an unflattened crest is 
evidence against it. 
•  Asymmetric scalars: this combination is like simple 
scalars, except the linear combination coefficients 
change based on whether the confidence in the 
antecedent is positive or negative. These are used in 
cases where the antecedent is more useful in drawing 
conclusions one way than another. For instance, we may 
be interested in whether one sample came from a 
different landform than the rest. If the samples were 
collected from the bedrock of the area, we can be very 
certain that they came from the same landform. 
However, we cannot be confident of a different origin 
simply because the samples were not taken from 
bedrock. 
• And-like combinations: if the confidence of every 
antecedent is positive, a constant confidence is assigned 
to the implicant of this rule. If any antecedent’s 
confidence is negative, then the confidence is the 
negative of the constant. For example, if all of the 
samples entered have the similar ages, we can conclude 
no process is needed to explain the data. Otherwise, we 
need to look for some process to explain our 
observations. 
•  Combination combinations: some rules use a compo-
sition of the other combinations (e.g. a scalar combi-
nation, instead of a constant, as the confidence value for 
an and-like combination). For instance, we can guess 
that a location is not cold enough for very much snow, at 
least in recent geological time, if it is both near the 
equator and at a relatively low elevation. Our confidence 
in the likelihood that the area does not get cold enough 
for significant snowfall goes up as we move closer to the 
equator and to even lower elevations. 
5.3. Evidence 
The data AICronus uses to draw its conclusions are 
referred to as evidence. The antecedents in a rule’s impli-
cation are patterns for evidence—they indicate what 
evidence will be needed to satisfy the rule. The actual data 
that causes us to conclude something about the antecedent 
is the evidence. The system has four different kinds of 
evidence: observations, simple calculations, complex 
calculations, and arguments. The distinction between these 
types of evidence is inspired by the PRET (Stolle and 
Bradley 1996) system. The separation allows less 
computationally intensive rules to be considered first. 
Observations Observations are direct uses of the data 
entered by the user. Usually an observation is some binary 
involving the data, for example checking that all samples 
have apparent ages less than a certain value. Because the 
user’s observations are generally assumed to be noisy, a 
piece of observational evidence has more confidence if the 
relation is stronger. For an antecedent like “elevation < 
10000 ft.”, we will be more confident that the condition 
has been met with an elevation value of 7000 ft. than a 
value of 9999 ft. Observations may also take the form of a 
quantifier such as for-all or there-exists. These are handled 
by selecting the highest (for there-exists) or lowest (for for-
all) individual confidence value among the quantified 
entities.  
Simple Calculations Simple calculations are generally 
calculations of simple statistical properties of entered data. 
They are used for the purpose of generating the 
calculation’s results and all simple calculations have a 
confidence value of 1. A simple calculation might find the 
mean of all apparent sample ages so that another part of the 
rule can check that all apparent sample ages fall within a 
certain distance of this mean. 
Simulations More complex calculations are called “sim-
ulations” because they usually are. Simulations have 
varying confidence values based on their results. They are 
implemented as procedures called by the engine examining 
the rules, allowing them to be as complex as necessary. An 
example simulation tries different levels of erosion, 
looking for the rate that causes the apparent sample ages to 
be closest together. The simulation returns this erosion rate 
(which can then be checked to confirm, e.g., that it is 
reasonable for the climate of the sampling area) and a 
confidence value indicating how well the returned rate 
reduces the spread in the calculated ages. 
Arguments Sometimes the antecedents of a rule cannot 
be directly gleaned from the input data. In this case it may 
be necessary to build a sub-argument for an antecedent and 
to use the sub-argument as evidence. For example, we 
know that snow cover is much less likely in areas that are 
not cold. The system can build a sub-argument for whether 
the sampling area is cold as part of an overall argument 
about snow cover. 
6. AICronus in Action 
Although still in a prototype stage, AICronus is able to 
produce answers and arguments similar to those produced 
by experts. Here is an example set of input data and the 
arguments constructed by the system for the likely 
conclusions—in this case, matrix erosion or inheritance. 
Two experts, shown this set of input data, concluded that 
the process affecting the data was almost certainly matrix 
erosion, primarily because of the distribution of apparent 
ages but also because the landform is a relatively old 
moraine with a flat crest. AICronus considered inheritance, 
but rejected it because the errors were too small and 
because all the sample appeared to have the same origin, 
making different inheritance levels for different samples 
unlikely. 
Example input set to AICronus: 








1 9500 500 A 
2 10000 600 A 
3 10500 400 A 
4 11000 450 A 
5 11500 550 A 
 
Here is the system’s output, given this input set: 
 
argument for conclusion matrix erosion: 
total confidence: 0.87 
  evidence for erosion: 
    age is approximately linear 
    landform is relatively old (>1000 yrs) 
    visual erosion observed 
     argument for conclusion visual-erosion: 
     total confidence: 0.6 
       evidence for visual-erosion: 
         flat crest 
       evidence against visual-erosion: 
         (none) 
    consistent with other landforms in area 
     argument for conclusion consistent-age: 
     total confidence: 1 
      evidence for consistent-age: 
        no other landforms known 
      evidence against consistent-age: 
        (none) 
    landform is a moraine 
  evidence against erosion: 
     (none) 
 
argument for conclusion inheritance: 
total confidence: 0.37 
  evidence for inheritance: 
    consistent with other landforms in area 
     argument for conclusion consistent-age: 
     total confidence: 1 
     evidence for consistent-age: 
       no other landforms known 
     evidence against consistent-age: 
       (none) 
    removal of older samples allows “no 
process” 
    landform is a moraine 
    does not violate max theoretical inher-
itance 
  evidence against inheritance: 
    small error values (<1000 yrs) 
    samples have same origin 
     argument for conclusion same-origin 
     total confidence: 0.5 
     evidence for same-origin: 
       all samples have same chemistry 
       not taken from bedrock 
     evidence against same-origin: 
       landform is a moraine 
 
Although both inheritance and erosion have positive con-
fidence values, the system’s confidence in erosion is much 
higher. This exactly matches the judgement of the experts 
who were shown these data. Moreover, AICronus’s 
arguments about the possible processes closely match the 
arguments given by the experts in each case. Despite the 
difficulties inherent in the field of cosmogenic isotope 
dating, AICronus already shows significant promise in 
understanding and automating the reasoning used by 
experts. 
7. Future Work 
AICronus is a work in progress. We plan a number of 
improvements over the next several years. The most 
critical of these improvements is expanding the system’s 
knowledge base. We are in the process of using this 
prototype version to solicit feedback and new knowledge 
from experts. In addition, we are working on integrating 
this system with the iCronus project (Anderson and 
Bradley 2006) so input data need not be entered by hand 
and output arguments can be presented visually rather than 
via the current command-line interface. We expect the 
system to go into regular use by geologists once these 
improvements are complete. 
We are considering other improvements to make the 
system more user-friendly. These include removing the 
numeric confidence values in the output to help avoid 
confusion and presenting arguments in a more natural 
prose form. Currently the system does not provide any 
assistance for going back to collect more samples to 
distinguish between processes that appear to have equally 
good arguments. We are considering an approach similar 
to (McIlraith and Reiter 1992) for implementing this 
functionality. 
Other future projects include allowing the user to engage 
in an argument with the system to update the knowledge 
base over time based on user input. We also hope to apply 
this framework to problems in other fields. 
8. Related Work 
Many diagnostic systems solve problems similar to the 
one solved by AICronus, in which there is some normal, 
expected behavior (in isotope dating, all samples of the 
same apparent age) and the causes of divergences from this 
behavior (e.g. a geologic process) must be diagnosed. 
However, the predominant paradigm in medical diagnosis 
is to build a complete model of a system and to use that 
model to make predictions about malfunctions (Lucas 
1997), (Struss 2004). This methodology is not suited to our 
particular domain because complete models of most 
geologic processes simply do not exist. In addition, model-
based systems are not as suited to handling contradiction. 
Diagnosis systems that handle contradiction do exist, for 
example (Doyle 1983), (Santos 1991), (Cem Say 1999) and 
(Gaines 1996). However, all of these systems use 
“absolute” rules. It is not possible to express the idea that 
some data may only partially support a conclusion. Instead, 
the conditions under which the rule does not provide 
support are explicitly encoded in the system. AICronus 
needs to include rules for partial support of conclusions in 
order to accurately reflect the reasoning process used by 
experts. For instance, experts are more likely to accept 
(and require more evidence to reject) an “inheritance” 
conclusion for a moraine than for other landform types. 
Trying to model this behavior without an ability to express 
partial support would be extremely difficult. On the other 
hand, all of these systems are capable of presenting their 
reasoning to the user to help convince experts of initially 
rejected conclusions, an important feature of AICronus. 
(Santos 1991) is also capable of presenting alternative 
conclusions to the user so that if the user does not agree 
with a particular conclusion the tool is likely to still be 
useful (another AICronus feature). 
Several authors have discussed the virtues of presenting 
the reasoning behind a system’s conclusions in the form of 
trees or arguments, including (Boy and Gruber 1990) 
(Bouwer and Bredeweg 2002) and (Gaines 1996). (Puyol-
Gruart, Godo, and Sierra 1992) points out that even when a 
particular conclusion cannot be reached by a reasoning 
system, it is likely that presenting what the system has 
managed to determine will be useful to the user. AICronus 
handles this situation by presenting its complete arguments 
even in cases where the absolute values of the confidences 
are quite small. 
Case-based reasoning (Kolodner 1993), (Cunningham, 
Bonzano, and Smyth 1995), and (Clark 1989) presents a 
way to sidestep the issues of partial support and 
contradiction by presenting intact the reasoning of experts 
on previous cases that are similar to the current problem 
instance. Unfortunately, case-based reasoning is unsuitable 
to AICronus because the field of cosmogenic isotope 
dating is still very new and relatively small. As a result, 
there are too few already-analyzed cases to cover all of the 
possible variables in selecting a responsible process. 
(Surma and Vanhoof 1995) seems to offer a solution to this 
objection by using rules for “normal” cases and case-based 
reasoning for cases that are exceptional in some way. 
Unfortunately, the problem being solved by AICronus has 
so many variables to address that it is difficult to classify 
any case as “normal.” 
(Turner 1992) uses schemas (abstracted cases) to perform 
diagnosis by considering particular symptoms. When a 
symptom is unique to a particular type of disease, the sys-
tem considers diagnosing that disease. If the symptoms 
expected for that disease are observed, then it is considered 
a correct diagnosis. The architecture they describe is not 
suitable to isotope dating because it fails to handle 
contradiction well. In addition, schemas are difficult to 
extract because it is difficult to determine what is typical 
for any process. 
Several kinds of defeasible reasoning besides argumenta-
tion have been put forth by various authors. These include 
circumscription (McCarthy 1980), (McCarthy 1986), 
default reasoning (Reiter 1980), (Doyle 1983), and other 
forms of nonmonotonic reasoning (Pereira, Alferes, and 
Apar’icio 1991), (Gaines 1996). Circumscription allows 
the definition of normal situations and the cases that can 
circumscribe them. It requires the definition of specific 
aspects that are abnormal only in abnormal situations, so 
that it is necessary to create a large number of “aspect” 
variables to express all of the possible abnormal situations. 
Default reasoning uses rules with default conclusions and 
then defines specific exceptions where they do not apply. 
This is similar to the “guards” on AICronus rules which 
prevent them being used to build arguments in some situ-
ations. The nonmonotonic logic defined in (Pereira, 
Alferes, and Apar’icio 1991) assigns a likelihood to 
various rules so that they can normally, sometimes, or 
exceptionally apply. Rules have conditions stating 
specifically when they do apply. (Gaines 1996) uses a tree 
structure for rules with default conclusions at the root and 
repeated refinements or rejections of the initial 
conclusion(s) as the tree is descended. 
While all of these logics are excellent choices for solving 
many different problems, they all require some explicit 
definition of when particular rules are defeated. The heu-
ristics used by our experts are insufficiently complete for 
these explicit definitions. Also, all of these nonmonotonic 
logics use defeat of specific rules rather than attacking 
conclusions. AICronus rules are not bound in a strict 
fashion to conclusions; a rule may be in support of a 
conclusion (but turn out to be unimportant in light of other 
rules or conclusions) or against one (but be negated by the 
presence of higher-confidence results elsewhere). 
(Etherington, Kraus, and Perlis 1991) describes other 
problems with various nonmonotonic logics. 
There is a large body of work on different kinds of argu-
mentation systems. Most of this work grapples with the 
question of when it is appropriate to declare a particular 
argument defeated, with different authors reaching various 
conclusions. Most authors (Dung 1995), (Pollock 1994), 
(Vreeswijk 1991), (Farley 1997), and (Prakken 1996) 
consider only absolute defeat of arguments. Little work on 
partial support and defeat has been done, although the 
Logic of Argumentation introduced by Krause et. al. 
(Krause, Ambler, Elvang-Gøransson, and Fox 1995), on 
which the AICronus framework is based, does partially 
address these issues. 
Few results exist for applying argumentation to specific 
problems. Most practical systems are aimed at communi-
cation-based applications, especially communication 
between agents (Parsons, Sierra, and Jennings 1998). The 
idea of argumentation as a form of communication has also 
been explored by (Prakken 1996), (Farley 1997) and 
(Vreeswijk 1993), who cast the construction of arguments 
as a form of dialectics. In these systems two agents 
repeatedly try to form arguments for a given conclusion, 
and then defeat those arguments. (Prakken 1996) allows 
defeat to take the form of defeating particular rules, rather 
than only the more traditional undercutting and rebuttal. 
This defeat is analogous to the attachment of confidence 
values to specific AICronus rules; rules with greater confi-
dence can defeat rules with smaller absolute confidences. 
(Farley 1997) allows the user to globally alter the relative 
strength of arguments. Three modes are allowed, where a 
conclusion is made if some argument for it exists, a 
conclusion is accepted if  there are more arguments for it 
than against it, and a strict mode where a conclusion is 
believed only if there is an argument for it and all 
arguments against it are defeated. The second mode in 
particular is similar to the mechanism used by AICronus, 
except that the strengths of the arguments in (Farley 1997) 
are not determined by which rules are used to form them—
all defeasible rules have the same believability. 
9. Conclusion 
Although still in its prototype stage, AICronus is a prom-
ising model for the process of cosmogenic isotope dating. 
Using a logic of argumentation, we have generated pre-
liminary results which closely parallel the reasoning and 
explanations of experts in the field. We expect that once 
the knowledge base for the system is complete AICronus 
will be able to reach insightful conclusions more quickly 
and consistently than experts under certain circumstances. 
In particular we expect this benefit in cases where 
superficially contradictory evidence disguises an extremely 
typical manifestation of some process. 
We expect that AICronus will be a significant 
advancement for the field of cosmogenic isotope dating. 
Creating AICronus forces experts to make explicit many 
implicit rules and theories, allowing the easier 
identification of faulty or missing theories.  
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